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CIRCULATED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

JP(61)97(Final)

21st July, 1961

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CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING
SUPPLEMENTARY BRIEF

Report by the Joint Planning Staff

In accordance with the instructions of the Chief of the Defence Staff, we have prepared a supplementary brief to our previous paper⁺ on LIVEOAK planning, to take account of the United States Memorandum[?] on measures for dealing with the Berlin situation.

2. In preparing the brief, which is at Annex, we have emphasized those aspects of the United States proposals which we consider require elucidation. We have consulted the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence.

Recommendation

3. We recommend that, if they approve our report, the Chiefs of Staff should authorize its use by their representative, in amplification of the main brief, at the forthcoming quadripartite talks on Berlin Contingency Planning.

(Signed) D.L. POWELL-JONES
E.B. ASHMORE
D.C. STAPLETON
W.C. SMITH.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

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● COS.904/24/7/61

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Annex to JP(61)97(Final)

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING
SUPPLEMENTARY BRIEF

INTRODUCTION

1. This brief is supplementary to the one which we have already prepared¹, and has been written to take account of the United States Memorandum² on measures for dealing with the Berlin situation. We have separately examined³ this Memorandum and given our general comments and the military implications for the United Kingdom of accepting the American proposals.

2. The basis of American policy over Berlin is that there should be negotiations; their proposals, however, are primarily designed to ensure that these would be undertaken from a position of increasing military strength, permitting a wide choice of options. Specifically in relation to Berlin the United States believe that the following precautionary and planning efforts should be undertaken within the next few weeks:-

- (a) Strengthen the position of West Berlin, to sustain an interruption of access, by reviewing and improving airlift procedures and the stockpile as necessary.
- (b) Review our Berlin contingency planning in the light of the present situation.
- (c) Complete Allied plans for use of a wide range of non-military counter-measures, including economic sanctions, upon interruption of access to Berlin or earlier as a warning and deterrent.

EFFECT OF AMERICAN PROPOSALS
ON THE UNITED KINGDOM LINE

3. The United States proposals, in so far as they refer to plans for access to Berlin, are more in harmony with our own views, although they are based on an approach to NATO strategy still very different from our own. However they either omit or are indefinite about certain matters which need to be clarified. These are discussed below.

Ground Operations

4. No specific mention is made of division sized operations but the Americans are obviously concerned over the gap between TRADE WIND, and the use of nuclear forces. Although the position of strength which they intend to build up is primarily intended for deterrence it is clear that they do not exclude offensive operations, presumably with the object of re-opening access.

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- 2 COS 90A/24/7/61
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Annex (Continued)

On the other hand, General Norstad has stated* that he does not advocate access operations on a large scale.

5. We appreciate that this gap in military measures does exist and consider that plans should be prepared to deal with any situation which might develop from interruption of access. These should be in a NATO context but we must maintain our view* that access to Berlin cannot be restored by an isolated military operation if the Russians are determined to prevent it.

6. If this is accepted, the difference of views about access operations may now be capable of reconciliation.

Air Operations

7. The American view that an airlift has more meaning against a background of increasing military strength brings them much closer to our own position than hitherto. However the place in the sequence of events which the Americans give to an airlift is not clear. The line given in our main brief* should be followed in discussing this point.

8. We agree that airlift resources and procedures should be reviewed.

Naval Action

9. The only naval tasks which the Memorandum envisages are described as "naval harassment and even naval blockading actions". These, it claims, are more likely to be suffered without major retaliation in a situation of growing Western power. Such actions do not appear to be related to any economic counter-measures listed elsewhere in the Memorandum, which are administrative in character, but they could be related to certain of the original LIVEOAK more elaborate military measures*. It would be advisable to ascertain what the United States have in mind, since further detailed planning would be necessary before any such actions could be implemented.

Planning and Operational Implications

10. It is implicit in the American proposals for NATO involvement that tripartite planning for direct military measures for Berlin will need to be related to wider NATO planning to meet Soviet reactions. General Norstad's opinion is that NATO should be brought in operationally at the earliest possible moment. This raises questions of co-ordination and access by non-tripartite nations to LIVEOAK plans and to JACK PINE/QBAL operations which are on a quadripartite basis.

11. Responsibilities for Berlin Contingency Planning are as follows:-

- (a) Overall co-ordination - the tripartite Ambassadorial Group in Washington.

* UKNMR 333
* COS.1205/22/9/59
+ COS(61)228
+ Appendix 'B' to COS(59)199
+ Annex to COS(60)58

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Annex (Continued)

- (b) Air access planning and certain special responsibilities concerning movements to Berlin - the tripartite Ambassadorial Group in Bonn. CINCSAFE is responsible for implementation of air access plans.
- (c) Emergency and more elaborate military measures - the LIVEOAK Group in Paris. General Norstad is responsible for overall planning supervision and CINCPACOR is responsible for the detailed planning and training for ground access operations.
- (d) Operational measures in Berlin - the tripartite Allied Staff, Berlin.

Thorough co-ordination between these widely spread groups has hitherto been difficult, and stringent tripartite security regulations have precluded the passing of LIVEOAK plans to other nations and NATO staffs. However, in 1960, CINCENT, COMLANDCENT and COMAIRCENT were informed personally; the German National Military Representative at SHLPE has received briefings from the LIVEOAK Group, and we have recently agreed to a German liaison officer for LIVEOAK. We have resisted French proposals that all planning should be done by a single high level group since we prefer military planning to be in General Norstad's hands from the outset, in view of his NATO responsibilities; and we consider that a great deal of other planning must inevitably be done in Bonn and Berlin where alone the necessary expert or local knowledge is available.

12. General Norstad has submitted proposals for LIVEOAK to be used as an operating staff if Contingency Plans are implemented, envisaging an augmented staff for continuous operations, though with SHLPE and USEWCOM providing intelligence support and SHAPE a public relations element. We now have reason to believe that General Norstad himself would welcome a broader approach.

UNITED KINGDOM VIEWS

13. We see the approach to the Berlin problem in two related parts. Access and the maintenance of a Western military presence in the city is a tripartite responsibility. The achievement of a position of strength from which, if negotiations fail, operations to re-establish access should be mounted, should be a NATO responsibility. We believe that the very specialized nature of the autobahn operations justifies both the planning functions of the LIVEOAK Group and the initial operational responsibility which General Norstad is anxious that they should have. We therefore consider that LIVEOAK planning must remain a separate entity, although working in close contact with SHLPE and that no nation other than the tripartite powers and Germany should participate.

14. Any wider participation in military planning without responsibility for execution, before the stage at which NATO as a whole needs to become directly involved, would not only complicate planning but would also infringe the responsibility of the Three Powers. We consider, however, that Belgium, Canada and the Netherlands, all of whom contribute forces to the Central Region, should be made aware of the plans. We feel

2 COS(61)42nd Mtg.
1 Annex to COS(60)58
2 Annex 'A' to COS.813/4/7/61
2 UKMR 333

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Annex (Concluded)

that adequate liaison could be maintained through their National Military Representatives at SHAPE.

15. We believe that LIVEOAK should not be responsible for planning beyond what is required for access to, and maintenance of, a Western military presence in Berlin. The wider military plans needed to achieve and exploit a general position of strength should be concerted on a NATO basis. The whole subject of the transition and inter-relationship between LIVEOAK and NATO planning responsibilities is in need of urgent clarification. It is desirable that such a study be set in train at the forthcoming meeting.

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